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Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology,
and the Socratic Method
Susan H. Williams*
I have been asked to comment on the papers presented by Judith Resnik
and Deborah Rhode. Deborah and Judith have both demonstrated how certain elements of feminist theory would move us toward transformations of
legal education, and of law practice as well. I would like to talk about the
contribution made by another aspect of feminist theory: the feminist critique
of mainstream epistemology. 1 First, I'll say a few words about how
Deborah's and Judith's transformative goals rest on a feminist epistemology,
and then I will turn to a more specific example of transformation. The Socratic method is perhaps the clearest expression of mainstream epistemological assumptions in traditional legal education. I'd like to explore whether a
feminist Socratic method is possible and what it might look like.
As Judith has pointed out, perhaps the most basic change needed right
now is to increase the number of women, particularly women of color, in
positions of authority in the legal profession and to eliminate the discrimination they presently experience. The barriers to such transformation lie in
many directions, but the most formidable one-which Judith identifies-is
the difficulty we have in hearing the deepest challenges posed to our system
of justice. For example, the pervasive and deep-rooted discrimination documented by gender bias task forces should cause a massive crisis of confidence, but instead such reports seem only to ripple the surface of our
cheerful optimism about the fundamental goodness of our social and legal
order.
Judith has explored a number of explanations for this persistent cheerfulness, ranging from the conservative influence of law and economics to feminists' desire to use the optimism of the conventional view as a lever for
change. I would like to suggest that there is also an epistemological reason
for this resistance, a reason that will require an epistemological response. As
Judith points out, it is possible, indeed it has become increasingly easy, for
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law; B.A., J.D., Harvard University.
1. By "mainstream epistemology" I mean the Cartesian tradition, in which an external and
objective reality is available to individual knowers through the use of their reason (perhaps combined
with their sense perceptions) and in which the knowledge thus attained is universal and neutral. See
Alison Jagger & Susan Bordo, Introduction to GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE 1, 3 (Alison Jagger &
Susan Bordo eds., 1939). For a full description of Cartesianism and the feminist epistemological
critique, see Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 401
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the guardians of the legal profession to admit that they are failing to live up
to their own ideal of neutrality. What is not so easy is to see that that failure
is an inevitable result of the ideal itself. A neutrality that attempts to ignore
differences in a world characterized by hierarchy will generate social ine3
quality. 2 And a neutrality that ignores inequality is not neutral.
This deeper criticism is too threatening to be acknowledged because it
calls into question not just a single legal ideal, but an entire epistemological
edifice. The traditional epistemological view that animates our legal system-and is also shared by a broad range of our social institutions-requires
that knowledge be a neutral, universally valid, objective description of an
independent reality. The feminist critique points out that that sort of neutrality is impossible because knowledge is always constructed within a particular social context and deeply permeated by it. Our knowledge cannot
4
transcend our values and cultural concepts, rather it is grounded in them.
If the very concept of neutrality is incoherent, then the foundation of all of
our knowledge may be called into question. This deeper challenge posed by
the work of gender bias task forces, among others, is a challenge to the very
idea of neutrality and to the theory of knowledge that depends upon it. It
may be difficult to hear that challenge until we have some alternative epistemological position in which to stand and from which to assess this crack in
5
the foundation of mainstream epistemology.
Deborah's paper focuses on the internal dynamics of American law
schools. She criticizes both the style and substance of contemporary legal
education from a feminist point of view. She finds the pedagogy to be often
hierarchical and authoritarian, emphasizing student's inadequacies and encouraging counterproductive competitiveness. The content of law school
2. This is one of the great lessons of the "difference" feminists: Ignoring differences can simply
magnify existing inequalities. For example, a "neutral" standard that asks all workers to meet certain levels of attendance, regardless of gender, exacerbates gender inequality rather than relieving it
because women's greater responsibilities for child rearing in our culture make them, on average, less
able to meet such standards than men. See Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
CAL. L. RaV. 1279, 1304-08 (1987).
3. Or, to put it another way, it is difficult to see the value in such neutrality. The reason for
pursuing neutrality was to ensure that irrelevant characteristics did not bias a decision. But if those
characteristics are simply being imported at an earlier stage in the process, then this type of neutrality loses much of its appeal. Would we think very highly of a neutral race in which all start and end
at the same lines, but some begin with ankle weights and others with Nikes?
4. This cultural grounding of knowledge occurs at several stages in knowledge formation, including defining a problem to study, see Sandra Harding, Introduction:Is There a FeministMethod?,
in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 1, 6 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987), defining the facts, see Ruth
Hubbard, Some Thoughts About the Masculinity of the Natural Sciences, in FEMINIST THOUGHT
AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE 1 (Mary M. Gergen ed., 1988); Naomi Scheman, Individualism and the Objects of Psychology, in DISCOVERING REALITY: PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY

AND METAPHYSICS 225, 229 (Sandra G. Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983), and interpreting
or analyzing data, see DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM,
DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW 30-31 (1991).

5. For suggestions about such an alternative position, see generally CORNELL, supra note 4
(developing a deconstructionist approach to feminist epistemology); SANDRA G. HARDING, WHOSE
SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? (1991) (developing a standpoint epistemology); Katharine T. Bartlett, FeministLegal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990) (developing "positionality" as an epistemological approach).
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teaching also fails by being too acontextual, paying insufficient attention to
the emotional and interpersonal aspects of legal practice, and neglecting ethical issues. Deborah suggests, and I agree, that these criticisms must be
grounded in normative principles rather than in some essentialist vision of
an alternative feminine way of doing things. I would simply like to point out
that those normative principles both rest on and give rise to certain epistemological principles. Let me take Deborah's substantive criticisms as an
example.
Deborah suggests that we need much more information about context in
our teaching materials, and more attention in classroom discussion to the
interpersonal and emotional aspects of cases. Legal training that neglects
these aspects is often inhumane to the students subjected to it, and sometimes even destructive of their sense of humanity. But it is not only because
of these moral considerations that we should include such aspects in our
teaching, it is also because they increase our relevant knowledge. That is, we
cannot really understand a case without understanding its context and its
personal impact. 6 The knowledge afforded by the traditional legal curriculum is, therefore, woefully inadequate to the task of lawyering and also, I
believe, to the task of thinking about the law. In other words, there is an
epistemological failure here as well as a moral failure.
Indeed, the important point is that the two failures are the same. Epistemology must rest on normative foundations because the interpretation that7
is an inevitable aspect of acquiring knowledge involves value judgments.
Similarly, our normative systems rest on certain knowledge claims, claims
about the nature of reality and of human life.8 The sharp division between
epistemology and ethics that is central to Enlightenment philosophy is rejected by feminist theory. Once that distinction is recognized as untenable, it
becomes clear that the moral failings of authoritarianism and hierarchy in
legal education cannot be justified by the need to maintain appropriate conditions for gathering or transferring knowledge. Such moral failings are, instead, themselves both the cause and the result of ignorance.
What would it mean for legal education if we took this feminist epistemological critique seriously? In particular, what would it mean for the Socratic method? The Socratic method is perhaps the clearest example of the
influence of mainstream epistemological assumptions in legal education. As
it is presently practiced in American law schools, the Socratic method involves a teacher asking a series of questions, ideally to a single student, in an
attempt to lead the student down a chain of reasoning either forward, to its
conclusions, or backward, to its assumptions. In itself, this might sound
6. This is one of the central insights of the pragmatist movement in legal thought, and of the
parallel development in feminist theory. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist,
63 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1699, 1707-09 (1990); see also Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In
Context, 63 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1597 (1990).

7. See Williams, supra note 1, at 407-09.
8. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 1-21 (1986) (describing two
different positions on the role of luck and chance in human life and their normative implications).
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harmless enough, but it has become the repository for all of the problems of
mainstream epistemology. In order to uncover these problems, it is only
necessary to ask what one would have to believe about the nature of human
knowledge in order to think that this was a good methodology for acquiring
or transmitting it.
To begin with, the structure of the exchange-in which the teacher unilaterally controls the direction of inquiry-rests on the assumption that
there is a fact-of-the-matter to be discovered and the teacher knows that fact
while the student may or may not. This structure suggests that learning is
strictly unidirectional: Knowledge flows from the teacher to the student and
not the reverse. The fact that the questions in the series are not individualized to the student implies that anyone can come to that knowledge and all
can come by the same path: the one mapped out by the teacher's questions.
This process also assumes that knowledge is something one finds rather than
creates; the teacher is guiding the student to look in the right place. The fact
that it is a chain of reasoning that is pursued implies that the primary path
to knowledge is through reason, reason of a particular instrumental and analytical kind. And finally, the one-on-one nature of the exchange casts knowledge seeking as a fundamentally individual activity; a teacher may help to
point out the path, but it is the mind of the individual knower that is the
primary tool.
Feminist theorists along with many others have challenged all of these
assumptions. Knowledge can be understood as a social practice deeply embedded in a particular culture. Facts are made, through a process of selection and interpretation, rather than found. One's position in a social
framework will have profound effects on what one knows and the path by
which one comes to know it, and no social position can claim access to some
undistorted truth. Knowledge is socially created, not individually discovered, and it is created through a process that involves emotion as well as
reason. Finally, knowledge is a relationship in which the knower and the
known can deeply affect each other's identities. As Alison Jagger has said,
"The reconstruction of knowledge is inseparable from the reconstruction of
ourselves." 9
If we want to incorporate this new epistemology into legal education, we
would, of course, begin by experimenting with new pedagogies, like those
Deborah suggested at the end of her paper. But would we need to abandon
the Socratic method entirely or is it possible to transform the Socratic
method into a process that would be consistent with this alternative epistemology? Can we rid it of its old epistemological baggage without destroying
any usefulness it may have?
Let me suggest a possible feminist reconstruction of the Socratic method.
If there is anything of value in this method, it is that it was not intended
simply to elicit information already in the student's possession. The goal, as
9. Alison Jagger, Love and Knowledge, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supranote 1, at 145,
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I see it, is instead to ask the kind of question which requires the student, in
attempting to answer it, to create knowledge she did not have the moment
before you asked the question. The question does this because it causes the
student to think and feel about the information in her possession in a new
way and then to articulate it. Described in this way, I believe that the Socratic method is fully consistent with a feminist epistemology.
Some modifications would, of course, be necessary in order to make the
practice match the concept. First, this kind of method does not imply that
knowledge is held by the teacher and acquired by the student. Teachers
could and should ask questions that might lead to knowledge they do not
themselves yet possess (in other words, questions to which they don't know
the answers). And students can ask such questions of each other and of their
teachers as well. We need to revive the ideal of Socratic dialogue, in which
knowledge and challenges to knowledge flow in both directions. The nature
of the questions should also change. The questions should seek to engage
not only rational analysis, but also emotional responses-like empathy and
moral outrage-because knowledge creation occurs through all of these capacities. 10 These emotional responses are particularly important because
they can function as windows through which we can glimpse reality as seen
from the perspective of a social position radically different from our own.
The questions also could focus attention on precisely the epistemological issues raised by a feminist approach: For example, what are the normative
foundations and implications of certain truth claims in law?
Of course, it is not only questions that can cause this learning experience.
Indeed, questions may be a relatively ineffective tool by themselves. I think
the increasing use of narrative in law teaching represents another way of
providing this opportunity for new thinking and feeling, I1 as does the application of knowledge in clinical settings or in simulation and role playing.
But I think that a role remains for a series of questions-whether following
some other mechanism or standing on their own-that asks the participants
to reflect on and articulate their new sense of the subject under discussion.
And I believe it is important that those questions, in good Socratic fashion,
push both forward to consequences and back to foundations in an effort at
understanding.
Indeed, this transformed Socratic method may have a significant role to
play in the further development of feminist epistemology. One of the great
difficulties facing an epistemology that recognizes the socially constructed
nature of knowledge is to find a basis for communication across the cultural
divides that separate us from each other. If there is no universally valid,
neutral standard to which we can all appeal, how are we to come to agree10. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 40-42 (1990); Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987).
11. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991); see also
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (telling stories that evoke emo-

tional responses in an efflort to generate greater understanding of the position of an African-American female law professor).
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ment given that we all begin from within our own highly contextual, particular positions?12 Although agreement can be founded on shared experience,
we cannot create a situation where we all share the same experiences. Moreover, we often wouldn't want to create such common experiences even if we
could, because it would destroy much of the diversity we are learning to
value. But we need to forge a foundation for understanding, and even for
some degree of agreement, across our differences if we are to mobilize the
broad support necessary to make the concrete changes that Judith and
Deborah describe.
The kind of dialogue in which participants are brought to see and feel
new things about old issues is, I think, one of the most hopeful avenues
toward such understanding, and ultimately agreement. By changing each
other through such conversations we might be able to create enough common ground to move forward together. One lesson feminists have learned in
recent years is that common ground must be created, it is not simply there to
be discovered. 13 It would be ironic and wonderful if the Socratic method, a
tool that has been used for so long to shore up an edifice of privilege and
oppression, could also be used, in new hands and with a new heart, to build a
better future.

12. See Williams, supra note 1, at 442-43.
13. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42
581, 615 (1990).
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